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I. Introduction
The need to understand in a more precise manner how food safety and animal and
plant health regulations affect trade is being driven, to a great extent, as a function of
challenges apparent in full implementation of the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (the "SPS Agreement") which entered into force
with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 1 January 1995.
Harmonization of regulatory requirements and product standards often is an
inevitable process of an integrated global trade regime.  Despite potential gains from
trade liberalization, difficulties that trading countries have faced in the course of
harmonization have become clear.  This process necessarily requires reform of domestic
trade policies among trading countries, and is expected to incur substantial costs to
several countries during the transition period, including the costs of the establishment of
modern and technology-intensive inspection and quality control infrastructure, and
production techniques.
Current situation of regulatory requirements and product standards are
substantially different across countries, typically between developed and developing
countries (World Bank, 2000).  The fact that the cumulative number of notifications to
WTO from developed and developing countries with regard to SPSs and other non-tariff
barriers has increased by 26 percent from 1995 to 1998 reflects the difficulties to achieve
concordance on harmonizing these standards (Wilson, 2000).  This implies that a
harmonization of domestic regulations and standards among the trading countries might
significantly alter current trade patterns.3
In December 2000 European Union (EU) harmonized maximum allowable level
of aflatoxins in cereals, dried and preserved fruits and nut imports at a level that was far
more stringent than levels in the other part of the world.  This policy reform is estimated
to reduce trade of these products by US$ 400 million or a half of the total imports from
nine African countries (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh, forthcoming).  Among the firms
opposing the limits were Argentina, Australia, brazil, Canada, Colombia, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey,
Uruguay and the US (1998, CRC Press LLC).
This paper reviews the current global pattern of trade in cereals, dried and
preserved fruits and nuts between world regions.  It also analyzes the growth of trade in
these products by world region.  It then estimates the elasticity of bilateral trade flow in
these products with respect to Aflatoxin B1 standard.  The analysis extends Otsuki,
Wilson and Sewadeh by broadening the country coverage to the global scope and by
explicitly incorporating free trade areas.  It finally simulates how global trade pattern of
these products will change when differing levels of harmonization of Aflatoxin B1
standard are assumed.
II. Econometric Model
When combined with data on food safety standards in importing countries,
bilateral trade flow data allow analysis of how differing level of standard affect promote
or limit trade between a particular pair of importing and exporting countries.  Various
combination of importing and exporting countries provides sufficient variation for
regression type of analysis.  We employ a gravity model in which value of trade flow is4
regressed on variables to measure size of a country’s economy, geographical distance,
and stringency of standards.
 Our specification of gravity model is as follows:
ln(Vij)  = b0+b1ln(GNPi) + b2ln(GNPj) + b3ln(GNPi) + b4ln(GNPj) + b5ln(DISTij) +
b6
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where Vij denotes value of trade from country j to country i.  It is obtained from trade data
of the United Nations Statistical Office.  Products that are included in this analysis
include wheat (SITC041), rice (SITC042), maize (SITC044), dried and preserved fruits
(SITC052), and nuts (SITC05171 and 05172).  We use data for the time period between
1995 and 1998.  Parameter b’s are coefficient and 
k
ij e   is the error term that is assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero.  GNPi and GNPj are real GNP of importing
country i and exporting country j in 1995 U.S. dollars, respectively. POPi and POPj are
population of importing country  i and exporting country  j, respectively.   DIST is
geographical distance between country i and j.
STi is maximum level of Aflatoxin B1 imposed on import by importing country i.
It is expressed as contamination in parts per billion.  It is obtained from FAO survey of
mycotoxin standards on food and feed stuffs in 1995 (FAO, 1995).  A greater value of
this variable implies a more lax regulation of Aflatoxin B1 contamination, and vise versa.
If this standard is applied at the border, products with Aflatoxin B1 contamination equal
to or below ST successfully enter the importing country.  Products with Aflatoxin B1
contamination above ST are retained in the exporting country or rejected at the importing
country’s border.  The coefficient for this variable in our gravity model generally implies5
changes in exports associated with an incremental change (relaxation or tightening) in ST.
If this standard does limits trade, this coefficient is expected to be positive.
Since data on aflatoxin standards are not available for most exporting countries in
this analysis, differences across exporting countries with respect to aflatoxin standards
cannot be measured.  This may cause omitted variable bias on the coefficient estimates.
Dummy variables for exporting countries consequently included to control for systematic
differences across exporting countries, which can partly capture the their differences with
respect to aflatoxin standards.  Dummy variables for products and year, and exporting
countries also are included in the model in order to control for systematic differences
across products and time.
III. Results
Two regression results are reported in Table 1.  The first column provides the
result of OLS and the second column provides the result of WLS.  The OLS result
indicates that distance is negative and significant as anticipated.  It shows that the
positive effect of GNP in importing countries but only at the 10 percent significance
level.  If it is considered to be significant, the sign is consistent with our anticipation.
Population of importing countries is positive and significant at the one percent level.
While multicollinearity is likely between these two variables, these positive signs suggest
size effect and income effect of importing countries.  Exporting countries GNP and
population are not significant.  This is perhaps because domestic consumption of food
products may have offset the size effect on their exports.
Aflatoxin B1 standards in importing countries are found to have had a negative
effect on trade flow.  This result is consistent with the findings in Otsuki, Wilson and6
Sewadeh.  Even when global trade is examined, it is found that a more stringent standard
tends to limit trade.
The EU dummy is found to be positive and significant, and the Mercosur dummy
is found to be positive and significant only at the 10 percent level.  The ASEAN dummy
is insignificant and the NAFTA dummy is negative and marginally significant.  This
indicates that regional arrangement does not always promote trade, or that trade
promotion effect due to liberalization have yet come into effect.
The WLS result generally supports the OLS result.  Only the Mercosur dummy
turns insignificant from marginal significance.  The OLS result can be said to be robust
against heteroscedasticity of the standard error.
The OLS result then is used to predict change in trade flow associated with
different levels of aflatoxin B1 standards.  Figure 1 presents the simulated relationship
between aflatoxin standard and total trade flow between the 31 exporting countries and
15 importing countries.  At the level recommended as international standard by Codex,
the total change is positive $11 billion or 5.3 percent from the 1998 total value of trade of
these products.  At the level implemented by EU, the total change is negative $ 12.5
billion or 6 percent from the 1998 total value of trade of these products.
We finally predict how trade patterns can be changed if Aflatoxin B1 standard is
harmonized at a level within the range of the standard.  One reasonable level would be
the level where gains and losses in trade flow from all the countries are equal.  This
break-even point provides a zero sum condition.  The break-even point is computed to be
4.81 ppb.  Changes in value of trade flow are computed for each importing and exporting7
country.  The trading partner within the sample countries which account for the largest
gain and loss of trade flow is then identified.
Table 2 presents the result for importing countries.  Export to Germany is
estimated to increase by 2.7 billion, which is the greatest among the importing countries.
Four EU countries, Germany, UK, France and Austria account for 100 percent gains from
the harmonization at the break-point level.  This reflects the fact that EU countries have
had the most stringent standard in the world.  The major exporting partners to these
countries are France, Germany and USA.  Except USA, these trading countries are in EU.
The harmonization thus will tend to increase intra-regional trade in EU or industrialized
countries in general.  The country which is estimated to reduce imports most is India
since it had the most lax standards among the exporting countries in the sample.
Table 3 shows the result of the same exercise for the exporting countries.  The
result indicates that France will increase exports most.  The seven EU countries account
for more than 90 percent of gains in exports.  Their trading partners are also EU
countries, Germany, France, UK and Austria.  This also confirms that the harmonization
at the break-even point will greatly increase intra-EU trade.  On the other hand, most
developing countries lose their export as a result.  USA and Canada will also decrease
their exports due to the contraction of mutual trade.  Their standards are also more lax
than the break-even level.
In sum, the change in trade patterns due to harmonization of Aflatoxin B1
standards at intermediate level is found to increase intra-EU trade.  It tends to reduce
trade flow among outside EU countries except for several transition economy.  The result
in general depends on the previous level of aflatoxin standards and dependency in terms8
of trade between countries.  The result illustrates the potential difficulty of harmonization
of standards globally, and likely loss of exports and imports among developing countries.9
Table 1. Regression Results (Dependent Variable = Value of Trade Flow)




Importer’s GNP 0.130* 0.130*
(0.071) (0.078)
Exporter’s GNP 1.211 1.211
(1.904) (1.996)
Importer’s population 0.262*** 0.262***
(0.089) (0.098)






Mercosur Member 1.071* 1.071
(0.597) (0.676)
ASEAN Member -0.332 -0.332
(0.817) (0.773)
EU Member 1.448*** 1.448***
(0.267) (0.243)








Nuts 1 4.865*** 4.865***
(0.408) (0.339)




Number of observations 3030
The time and exporter dummies are suppressed.10
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Germany +2720 33 +66 France 641
UK +2492 30 +66 France 643
France +2192 27 +89 Germany 460
Austria +797 10 +100 USA 188
Israel -19 0 -2 Tanzania 5
Spain -51 -1 -2 USA 14
Italy -63 -1 -2 USA 14
Brazil -66 -1 -2 Argentina 22
Australia -122 -1 -15 USA 37
USA -687 -8 -24 Canada 174
Malaysia -809 -10 -34 India 209
Japan -820 -10 -24 USA 251
Canada -901 -11 -17 USA 774
Nigeria -1151 -14 -36 Tanzania 348
India -3523 -43 -39 Tanzania 82011





























France +1250 29.3 +44 UK 643 India 19
Germany +761 17.8 +46 France 460 India 16
Italy +711 16.7 +42 Germany 301 India 31
The Netherlands +696 16.3 +57 Germany 359 India 6
Spain +469 11.0 +39 France 201 India 18
Hungary +239 5.6 +32 Austria 158 India 28
Austria +55 1.3 +32 Germany 29 India 2
Romania +36 0.8 +11 Germany 24 India 21
Denmark +34 0.8 +43 Germany 17 India 1
Kazakhstan +15 0.4 +4 Germany 27 India 37
Russia +4 0.1 +4 Germany 7 India 9
Nigeria -1 0.0 -1 France 4 India 8
Egypt -1 0.0 -3 UK 1 India 2
Israel -1 0.0 -4 UK 1 India 3
Mexico -14 0.3 -10 UK 4 India 8
Uruguay -16 0.4 -6 UK 3 India 7
Paraguay -22 0.5 -5 UK 4 India 9
Zimbabwe -26 0.6 -14 France 5 India 19
Senegal -33 0.8 -6 Germany 19 Nigeria 37
Brazil -73 1.7 -11 Germany 22 India 42
South Africa -77 1.8 -13 Germany 16 India 51
India -135 3.2 -3 Germany 182 Malaysia 209
Argentina -136 3.2 -6 Germany 29 India 64
Canada -168 3.9 -13 Germany 29 USA 174
Australia -197 4.6 -18 Germany 21 India 116
Sri Lanka -265 6.2 -25 Germany 17 India 219
Vietnam -280 6.6 -25 Germany 16 India 187
Thailand -398 9.3 -25 Germany 22 India 264
Pakistan -708 16.6 -32 Germany 19 India 704
USA -737 17.3 -5 Germany 480 India 774
Tanzania -991 23.2 -14 Germany 197 India 82012
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